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I. INTRODUCTION

The civil commitment of mentally ill individuals presents the
legal system with an intractable question: When should the law
deprive someone of the fundamental right to liberty based on a
prediction of future dangerousness? Advocates of both increased and
decreased levels of civil commitment offer compelling case studies to
help resolve the question. The former point to high profile events like
the Virginia Tech shooting, in which mandatory incapacitation of the
perpetrator at the first sign of mental illness could have prevented a
senseless tragedy.1 The latter highlight the lives of individuals like
Kenneth Donaldson, whose father had him committed on scanty
evidence of "delusions." He was held in a mental institution for fifteen
years despite the absence of proof that he posed a threat to himself or
society. 2 Cases like these demonstrate that civil commitment statutes
must strike a balance that not only protects the populace from
dangerous individuals but also allows harmless individuals to retain
their civil rights.
3
Civil commitments cause "massive curtailment[s] of liberty."
Hospitalized patients must remain within the institution, often with
limited freedom inside the building. 4 Even patients receiving
outpatient treatment must report to the hospital regularly, severely
restricting their liberty. 5 Further, these patients may not have the
option to refuse unwanted examinations or treatment, 6 and their
commitment period can last indefinitely. 7 In addition to these
immediate concerns, individuals who have been committed bear the
8
social and legal stigma of past hospitalization after their release.
Because involuntary civil commitment results in such a significant
deprivation of liberty, its use invokes constitutional due process
protections. 9

1.
E. Fuller Torrey, Commitment Phobia,WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2007, at A17.
2.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 565-66 (1975).
3.
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
4.
Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190,
1193-1201 (1974).
5.
Id. at 1193 n.1.
6.
Id. at 1194.
7.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 419 (1979) (noting mother's petition for the
"indefinite" civil commitment of her son under Texas law).
8.
Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1198-1201.
9.
Addington, 441 U.S. at 425. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The Supreme Court has interpreted due process as
protecting individuals against two types of government actions. United States v. Salerno, 481
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A number of Supreme Court cases have delineated the
substantive due process requirements for civil commitment. Notably,
O'Connor v. Donaldson established that an individual must be both
mentally ill and dangerous before a state can involuntarily hospitalize
him. 10 More specifically, he must pose a danger either to himself or to
others." While courts cite this proposition as the O'Connor holding, it
does not adequately summarize the constitutional requirement of the
dangerousness standard, which, on further examination, requires a
due process balancing of the state interest against individual liberty in
every case. Also, there is no consensus among jurisdictions about what
constitutes dangerousness, though commitment statutes often refer to
three criteria: the type of danger, the immediacy of the danger, and
the likelihood of the danger.1 2 However, not all of these criteria appear
in every civil commitment statute, 3 and the O'Connor Court offered
little guidance about how to define "dangerous."'14
The Court later addressed the level of procedural due process
necessary for civil commitment in Addington v. Texas, holding that
the government must prove both of the substantive due process
requirements-mental illness and dangerousness-by "clear and
convincing evidence."' 5 In mandating a heightened standard of proof,' 6
the Court acknowledged that civil commitments require a formal
hearing to satisfy procedural due process. 17 Though the Court did not
specify the exact parameters of such proceedings, almost all states
mandate assistance of counsel as a basic due process requirement of
8
civil commitment hearings.'

U.S. 739, 746 (1987). First, "substantive due process" limits the government's ability to engage in
conduct that infringes upon certain fundamental rights or "shocks the conscience." Id.; Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). Second, "procedural due process" prohibits the government
from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property without adequate procedural safeguards.
Cf. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172 (holding that forcible extraction of stomach contents violates due
process).
10. 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
11. Id.
12.

BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 61-64

(2005).
13. Id.
14. Reed Groethe, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for
Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 562, 568-69 (1977).
15. 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
16. Id.
17. RALPH REISNER, CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & ARTI RAI, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 699, 781-86 (4th ed. 2004).
18. SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 69-71 (3d ed. 1985);
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY 53-113 (1994).
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Regrettably, courts have failed to provide patients' attorneys
with guidance on how to protect their clients' due process rights. 19
Consequently, two models of patient representation have emergedthe "adversarial" approach and the "best interests" approach. 20 The
adversarial attorney acts as a zealous advocate for his client's wishes,
which usually are against hospitalization, regardless whether he
believes that the client needs treatment. 2 1 The best interests attorney
acts as more of an advisor than a traditional advocate. 22 An attorney
following this approach will not work toward his client's release if he
believes that his client will benefit from treatment. 23 As a result,
hearings undertaken by best interests attorneys tend to be more
informal than traditional adversarial hearings. 24 In practice, the best
interests model currently dominates mental health courts, 25 having
been adopted by attorneys and also by judges, psychiatrists, the
families of respondents, and others, creating a largely non-adversarial
26
framework for civil commitment hearings.
This Note argues that the representation style used by an
attorney in a civil commitment hearing can subvert the substantive
standards mandated by due process. Part II identifies the parameters
of due process in the civil commitment context and examines the two
approaches to civil commitment representation. Part III revisits
O'Connor, illustrating how that case applies a more stringent due
process balancing test than its distilled holding indicates. It then
evaluates the two approaches to patient representation based on the
ways in which each preserves the dangerousness standard, concluding
that the best interests approach violates O'Connor by allowing the

19. Joshua Cook, Note, Good Lawyering and Bad Role Models: The Role of Respondent's
Counsel in a Civil Commitment Hearing,14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 179, 182 (2000).
20. Id. at 179; see also Janet B. Abisch, Mediational Lawyering in the Civil Commitment
Context, 1 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 120, 120 (1995) (advocating a model that incorporates the
therapeutic aspects of adversarial and best interests representation); Henry Chen, The
MediationApproach: Representing Clients with Mental Illness in Civil Commitment Proceedings,
19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 599, 610-12 (2006) (advocating a mediation approach to respondent
representation); Donald H. Stone, Giving a Voice to the Silent Mentally Ill Client: An Empirical
Study of the Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Hearing, 70 UMKC L. REV. 603, 605-09
(2002) (examining the results of an attorney survey showing that respondents' counsel are
generally non-adversarial).
21. Cook, supra note 19, at 179-80.
22. Abisch, supra note 20, at 129.
23. WINICK, supranote 12, at 142.
24. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 n.17 (1979); Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 41-44
(1999).
25. WINICK, supranote 12, at 142.
26. Winick, supra note 24, at 41-44.
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state to commit the mentally ill without sufficient proof of
dangerousness. Finally, Part IV proposes a two-part solution in which
(1) the Supreme Court modifies the dangerousness standard by
requiring a due process balancing test in all civil commitment cases;
and (2) courts require that attorneys provide adversarial
representation so they do not dilute the substance of the
dangerousness standard.
II. BACKGROUND: THE CURRENT STATE OF DUE PROCESS IN CIVIL
COMMITMENT HEARINGS

The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments limits states' abilities to
commit the mentally ill by requiring both substantive and procedural
safeguards. This Part explores due process as it applies to civil
commitment hearings and investigates the practical effect that these
constitutional limitations have inside mental health courtrooms.
A. The Emergence of a ConstitutionalModel of Civil Commitment
Prior to the 1970s, civil commitment operated as a medical
model in which courts exercised little influence and physicians'
27
opinions about a patient's need for treatment were determinative.
Because the law provided no clear standard for commitment, its
imposition was arbitrary and often unnecessary. 28 In many states,
commitment procedures required only findings from two physicians
that the patient was "ill and a proper subject for treatment in a
psychiatric hospital."29 Patients in these cases often did not appear
before a judge.3 0 A majority of states did not provide counsel to
indigent respondents, 31 and when counsel was present, the hearings
were "characterized by mutual expectations of perfunctory
performance." 32 As a result, hospitals became overcrowded with
33
patients held on questionable grounds.

27. Id. at 4.
28. Id.
29. CHEN, supranote 20, at 601.
30. Id.
31. See Fred Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
44 TEX. L. REV. 424, 461-66 app. A (1966) (listing various state laws regarding indigent
representation).
32. Id. at 448.
33. CHEN, supra note 20, at 602.
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The civil rights movement of the 1960s led to significant
mental health law reforms with a new emphasis on patients' rights
and deinstitutionalization. 34 Eventually, the medical model gave way
to a constitutional model that focused on the government's ability to
deprive a patient of liberty. 35 Many states replaced rules authorizing
indefinite commitment with time limit requirements and periodic
review. 36 They also passed laws imposing stricter legal standards,
including formal hearings, thereby shifting power from physicians to
judges. 37 This shift increased the consistency of hearings, decreased
the number of patients in state mental hospitals, 38 and prevented
unneeded hospitalizations. However, it put final commitment
authority into the hands of legal professionals who often failed to
understand the clinical aspects of mental illness, 39 and it led to the
release of many patients who could not care for themselves, some of
whom became indigent or homeless. 40 Though the constitutional model
persists, doctors have resumed a more prominent role in civil
commitment hearings. As will be discussed later in this Note, courts
4
regularly defer to doctors' opinions with little or no challenge. '
In addition to the state law reforms, the constitutional
boundaries of civil commitment were addressed by the Supreme
Court, which established minimum substantive due process
requirements for these hearings. The first requirement, established in
Foucha v. Louisiana, is that the patient suffer from a treatable mental
illness. 42 The second, this Note's focus, is the dangerousness standard
43
adopted by the Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson.
B. O'Connor and the DangerousnessStandard
The oft-cited "danger to self or others" standard that has
persisted for over thirty years in the civil commitment context earned
constitutional legitimacy in O'Connor v. Donaldson.44 As discussed in
34.

Id.

35.

WINICK, supra note 12, at 4.

36.
37.

Id. at 4-5.
Id.

38.

CHEN, supra note 20, at 602.

39.

WINICK, supra note 12, at 5.

40. Id.
41. See infra Section II.D.3.
42. 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992). In this case, the petitioner suffered from antisocial personality
disorder, which is not characterized as a mental illness and is untreatable. Id. at 85. The court
ruled that, without a treatable mental illness, the state had no basis for holding him. Id.
43. 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
44. For relevant facts of this case, see id. at 564-68, 576.
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the Introduction, Kenneth Donaldson was committed as a mental
patient in a Florida state hospital after a county judge found that he
suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. During fifteen years of
confinement, the superintendent of the hospital denied Donaldson's
persistent requests for release. The testimony before the district court
showed that Donaldson did not pose a threat to others and had never
displayed suicidal tendencies. Further, pledges from responsible
people willing to care for him accompanied his petitions for release.
The Supreme Court held that a finding of mental illness alone was
insufficient to sustain confinement, declaring that "a State cannot
constitutionally confine, without more, a nondangerous individual who
is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of
45
willing and responsible family members or friends."
Under O'Connor, then, to confine a person against his will, the
state must prove at least one of the "generally advanced" justifications
for civil commitment: a risk of harm to self or others, the inability to
46
care for oneself, or the need for treatment to cure a mental illness.
Based on the Court's language, some theorists have suggested that
dangerousness is not required in every instance; a state may be able to
commit someone if it can prove the third prong-a "need for
treatment." 47 Courts have not determined conclusively whether this
prong constitutes an independent ground for commitment. Indeed,
they, along with legislatures, have ignored it, demanding proof of
dangerousness prior to civil commitment. 48 In Jones v. United States,
the Supreme Court collapsed the O'Connor standard, declaring that
"the Due Process Clause requires the Government in a civilcommitment proceeding to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous." 49 In the
years following O'Connor, every state modified its civil commitment
statute to reflect the changes or interpreted its then-existing statute
to include a dangerousness component. 50
The O'Connor Court's holding stemmed from the "compelling
government interest" test, which allows the government to infringe on
a fundamental right to the extent that it furthers a compelling state

45. Id. at 576.
46. Id. at 573-74; see also Groethe, supra note 14, at 581 (discussing whether or not courts
are justified in making overt dangerous behavior a prerequisite for involuntary civil
confinement).
47. Groethe, supra note 14, at 581.
48. Id.
49.

463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983).

50. PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE LIMITS OF
CHANGE 28 (1994).
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interest. 51 Two interests that traditionally justify intrusive state
52
action are the state's police power and its parens patriae interest.
The police power permits the government to advance the general
welfare of society, even at the expense of individual liberty. 53 The
parens patriae interest allows the state to protect those individuals
who are incapable of protecting themselves, 54 and it turns on a finding
of the patient's incompetency. 55 Because incompetency is difficult to
define, and even more difficult to measure, many commentators
support a presumption of competency, with the burden on the state to
prove otherwise. 56 The dangerousness standard encompasses both of
these justifications, invoking the police power rationale when the state
commits an individual who is dangerous to others, and the parens
patriae interest when the state commits an individual who is
57
dangerous to himself.
Although there is no consensus among the states as to what
constitutes a danger, legislators generally consider three criteria: the
type of danger, the immediacy of the danger, and the likelihood of the
danger. 58 The type of danger refers to the category of the harm.
Examples include bodily harm, threat of bodily harm, and property
damage. 59 Immediacy accounts for when the danger will occur. Some
require "imminent" danger6 0 or danger in the
statutes, for example,
"near future."6 1 As these forecasts project further into the future,
uncertainty and the risk of error increase. The likelihood of the danger
refers to the accuracy of the dangerousness prediction.6 2 Because
studies have found that such predictions are more accurate when

51. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
52. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 296 (1982). Parens patriae is Latin for "parent of his or
her country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
53. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905).
54. Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
55.

WINICK, supra note 12, at 66.

56. Id. at 67.
57. Id. at 99.
58. Id. at 61-64.
59. Id. at 61.
60. Id. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1 (2003) ("substantial risk of imminent harm to ...
[the patient] or others"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.2 (2002) ("imminently dangerous to self or
others"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126 (2002) ("imminent threat of injury to the respondent or
to others").
61. WINICK, supra note 12, at 62. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915 (2002) ("likely in the
near future to cause physical injury, physical abuse or substantial property damage"); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 394.467 (2003) ("substantial likelihood that in the near future he or she will inflict serious
bodily harm on himself or herself or another person").
62.

WINICK, supra note 12, at 63.
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based on prior overt acts, 63 some states require evidence of similar
dangerous behavior in the respondent's recent past. 64 Using these
three criteria, the most extreme form of danger is "serious, imminent,
and certain," 65 but states' laws require varying levels of each
66
descriptor and may not even incorporate all three components.
Also, danger-to-self encompasses more than self-inflicted
physical harm.6 7 The O'Connor Court noted that "even if there is no
foreseeable risk of self-injury or suicide, a person is literally
'dangerous to himself if for physical or other reasons he is helpless to
avoid the hazards of freedom." 68 Therefore, some states allow
involuntary commitment for passive dangerousness based on either an
70
inability to take care of oneself 9 or a "grave disability."
Finally, the compelling interest test requires that the danger,
whether rooted in police power or parens patriae, bear a reasonable
relationship to the deprivation of liberty. 71 The Court has stated that
"even [when] the government purpose [is] legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
72
fundamental liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."
More than half of the states have incorporated this principle into their
civil commitment statutes with a "least restrictive alternative"
requirement, insisting that courts consider whether less restrictive
community treatment options, such as outpatient facilities, would
73
satisfy the government's interest.

63.
64.

Groethe, supra note 14, at 584.
Id. at 562-63.

65.

WINICK, supra note 12, at 61.

66.
67.
68.

Id. at 61-64.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1975).
Id. at 574 n.9.
69. WINICK, supra note 12, at 100. See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/1-119 (West
2003) ("a person with a mental illness and who because of his or her illness is unable to provide
for his or her basic physical needs so as to guard himself or herself from serious harm").
70. WINICK, supra note 12, at 100. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 12-26-1-1 (2003) ("an individual
who is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled may be involuntarily detained or
committed").
71. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731-39 (1972).
72. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
73. WINICK, supra note 12, at 71. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(4) (2003) ("in the
least restrictive treatment facility which can meet the patient's treatment needs"); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 5151 (2003) ("If... the person can be properly served without being detained, he or
she shall be provided evaluation, crisis intervention, or other inpatient or outpatient services on
a voluntary basis").
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C. Addington and ProceduralDue Process Requirements
In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court mandated a "clear
and convincing" burden of proof in civil commitment hearings. 74 In
that case, Addington's mother filed for his indefinite commitment after
a threatened assault. After a full trial, the judge submitted the case to
the jury with the instruction that it could commit him only if the state
had proved its case with "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence.
Addington argued that this standard violated his due process rights.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the standard used in criminal
trials-"beyond a reasonable doubt"-would place too great a burden
on the state because "[g]iven the lack of certainty and the fallibility of
psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state
could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both
mentally ill and likely to be dangerous." The "preponderance of the
evidence" standard used in most civil litigation would have the
opposite result, however, by permitting too many unnecessary
commitments. The Court therefore mandated an intermediate
standard of proof in civil commitment hearings that "strikes a fair
balance between the rights of the individual and the legitimate
concerns of the state."
The clear and convincing evidence standard required by
Addington presupposes that more basic procedural requirements
apply in the civil commitment context; 75 indeed, for an evidentiary
standard to exist, it must be applied in an adjudication. While
procedural due process elements in civil commitment hearings vary
from state to state, respondents generally are entitled to a hearing
presided over by a fair and impartial judge, at which the respondent
76
can be present, offer evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. Most
states also grant the right to counsel, who will be appointed if the
respondent is indigent, 77 and some states have established the right to
a court-appointed clinical evaluator. 78 Though these standards are
well established in theory, the next Part examines the ways in which
courts have become complacent about these procedures in practice.

74. For the relevant facts and quotations of this case, see 441 U.S. 418, 420-33 (1979).
75. WINICK, supra note 12, at 141. Notice may not be required prior to commitment,
however, if the commitment is sought on an emergency basis. Id.
76. Winick, supra note 24, at 40.
77. WINICK, supra note 12, at 141.
78. PERLIN, supra note 18, at 88-89.
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D. Approaches to Civil Commitment Representation
The Supreme Court has mandated limited procedural
guarantees, but it has not offered attorneys guidance as to how they
should represent candidates for civil commitment. 79 The ABA's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct also provide minimal assistance,
advising lawyers who represent diminished capacity clients to "as far
as
reasonably
possible,
maintain
a normal
lawyer-client
relationship."8 0 The Rules allow the lawyer to take "protective action"
when he "reasonably believes that the client has diminished
capacity."8 1 However, the attorney must unilaterally determine when
their patient has "diminished capacity."8 2 As a result, two models of
patient representation have evolved-the adversarial approach and
the best interests approach.8 3 For more than two decades, jurists and
academics have debated the relative merits of these competing
models,8 4 and some commentators have developed hybrid models, such
as the "mediational" or the therapeutic approach.8 5 The crux of the
debate, however, remains between the adversarial and best interests
approaches.
1. Adversarial Approach
The typical trial lawyer adopts the adversarial model of
representation. This model is premised on the theory that the correct
outcome in any dispute will be revealed when the opposing sides
confront one another in the courtroom, each exposing the weaknesses
of the other's position.8 6 Ideally, this approach prevents the attorney's
individual biases or presumptions from interfering with the outcome
of the case, because the attorney must serve as a zealous advocate
regardless of his personal beliefs.8 7 The adversarial model in the civil
88
commitment context, however, differs from the criminal trial version.
For example, mentally ill patients may not be able to express their
desires cogently; in that case, the adversarial attorney will presume
79.

Cook, supra note 19, at 182.

80. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (1983).

81. Id.
82. Cook, supra note 19, at 190.
83. Id. at 179-80.
84. Abisch, supranote 20, at 120.
85. See, e.g., id. at 122 (advocating a model that incorporates the therapeutic aspects of
adversarial and best interests representation); Winick, supranote 24, at 53 (same).
86. Abisch, supranote 20, at 123.
87. Id. at 120.
88. Cook, supra note 19, at 183-85.
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that the client favors liberty over commitment.8 9 This approach
respects the autonomy of the patient by assuming that he can make
his own decisions regarding his care and that he deserves freedom
unless it can be proven otherwise.
The adversarial approach is not without its drawbacks. In some
cases, the attorney must advocate for the release of a patient who
needs treatment, 90 which could result in harm to the patient, the
patient's family, or to the larger community. Also, adversarial
attorneys must adhere to their client's wishes even though the
expressed desires may be clouded by mental illness; thus, the
adversarial attorney may have to fight for a result that even the
patient would oppose if he were healthy. 91 Additionally, adversarial
attorneys tend to project a competitive attitude that92 can negatively
affect the patient's own disposition toward treatment.
2. Best Interests Approach
The best interests attorney evaluates objective information to
determine the course of action that the client would choose if he were
not impaired by a mental illness. 93 This approach recognizes that
illness may distort a patient's ability to determine his own best
interest. 94 Attorneys operating under this model presume that
mentally ill clients need to be protected and habilitated by the state. 9 5
They often serve as fact finders and advisors, similar to guardians ad
litem, 96 rather than as zealous advocates. 97 As one proponent argues,
"[i]t is time for lawyers to lawyer in the mental institution situation
with responsibility and sensitivity."9 8 Further, attorneys seem to
adopt the best interests approach naturally; one study has indicated
that even when lawyers are trained in adversarial methods of

89. Abisch, supra note 20, at 120.
90. Id. at 123.
91. Id. at 129.
92. Id. at 127.
93. Cook, supra note 19, at 179.
94. Abisch, supra note 20, at 129.
95. Id. at 121.
96. Guardiansad litem, appoint to represent minor defendants, serve as officers of the
court or fiduciaries, with the duty to protect the best interests of the minor. 42 AM. JUR. 2d
Infants § 183 (2008). They do not act as advocates. Id.
97. Paul S. Appelbaum, Paternalismand the Role of the Mental Health Lawyer, 34 HOSP. &
COMM. PSYCH. 211 (1983) (noting that, in the 1970s, "most lawyers involved in civil commitment
hearings abandoned their traditional adversary role").
98. Id. at 212.
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representation, they continue to exhibit paternalistic behavior in civil
99
commitment hearings.
This more sensitive approach faces serious criticism. First, it
presumes that an attorney, who generally has no clinical training or
expertise in the area of mental health, can determine what course is in
the best interests of the patient. 100 Moreover, this approach can
undermine the autonomy of the client and increase unnecessary
institutionalization. 0 1
One
commentator
contends
that the
paternalistic role derives from a deeply rooted prejudice against
people with mental illnesses, perpetuating the stereotype that they
never can make decisions for themselves. 0 2 Best interests attorneys
also are criticized for "paper pushing," playing a clerical role to give
the appearance of representation. 0 3 The most serious critique,
however, is that attorneys who follow the best interests model violate
their clients' due process rights by assuming, prior to trial, that the
patients are proper subjects for state paternalism. 0 4
3. Realities in the Courtroom
Although mentally ill respondents receive formal hearings,
these proceedings are widely criticized for their lack of any real
formality. Empirical studies show that the mean duration of civil
commitment hearings ranges from 3.8 to 9.2 minutes. 0 5 These
hearings often occur in makeshift courtrooms set up in hospitals
where patients appear before the judge in hospital gowns. 0 6
Observers have noted that judges frequently fail to inform
respondents of their legal rights, do not permit them to participate in
the proceedings, and downplay the role of respondents' attorneys by
discouraging them from speaking or questioning witnesses. 107 Finally,
judges tend to rubber stamp the recommendations of expert witnesses
offered by the state; one study found that judges agree with expert
witnesses in civil commitment hearings between 79 and 100 percent of

99. Norman G. Poythress, Jr., Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training
Attorneys to Cope with Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1978).
100. Abisch, supranote 20, at 132.
101. Id.
102. MICHAEL PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE 48-57 (2000).

103. Winick, supranote 24, at 43.
104. Id.

105. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 n.17 (1979).
106. PERLIN, supra note 18, at 63-64.
107. Eric Turkheimer & Charles D.H. Parry, Why the Gap? Practice and Policy in Civil
Commitment Hearings, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 646, 647 (1992).
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the time. 108 Even the Supreme Court has noted that in civil
commitment hearings "the supposed protections of an adversary
proceeding ... may well be more illusory than real,"'1 9 amounting to
"time-consuming
procedural
minuets before
the
[patient's]
1
10
admission."
The informal nature of these proceedings has been
criticized not only as a violation of due process, but also as an antitherapeutic exercise that devalues the patient and engenders distrust
in the legal system.'
Attorneys who have adopted the best interests approach to
representation often bear the blame for these hearings' lack of
meaningful procedure."1 2 One study found that only 2.3 percent of
outside counsel, most of whom are appointed, contests the finding of
mental illness." 3 Frequently, respondents' attorneys do not meet their
clients until the hearing, nor do they seriously investigate the facts
alleged to justify the commitment." 4 Many attorneys do not seek
alternatives to hospitalization. 11 5 These attorneys often fail to
challenge clinicians, performing little or no cross-examination and
often waiving the patient's right to testify." 6 Because many attorneys
take on this paternalistic role-deferring to experts, not zealously
advocating the respondent's rights, and in some cases waiving these
rights-some commentators speculate that an unrepresented patient
may have a greater chance of release than one represented by
7
counsel."
Debate continues as to the optimal type of respondent
representation in civil commitment hearings. Though the best
interests approach predominates in most courtrooms, it is not
necessarily the method that best upholds the constitutional minimums
mandated by the Supreme Court. The next Part examines how these
representation styles influence the dangerousness standard.

108. Norman G. Poythress, Jr., Mental Health Expert Testimony: Current Problems, 5 J.
PSYCHIATRY& L. 201, 213 (1977).
109. Parham, 442 U.S. at 609.
110. Id. at 605.
111. WINICK, supra note 12, at 143.
112. Id. at 144.
113. Virginia A. Hiday, The Attorney's Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C. L.
REV. 1027, 1039 (1982).
114. Jan C. Costello, Why Would I Need a Lawyer? Legal Counsel and Advocacy for People
with Mental Disabilities,in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL DISORDER 15, 30 (Bruce D. Sales
& Daniel W. Shuman eds.. 1996).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.; WINICK, supranote 12, at 144.
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III. ANALYSIS: THE INTERSECTION OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS STANDARDS IN CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARINGS

Current legal scholarship on due process in the civil
commitment context has examined the two major areas on which this
Note has focused: the dangerousness standard' 1 8 and respondent
representation, 119 which represent, respectively, substantive and
procedural due process. To date, however, research has not examined
the two in concert to see how they influence each other.
This Analysis begins with a reexamination of O'Connor; the
dangerousness standard as applied in that case is informed by a basic
due process balancing test that has been overlooked in civil
commitment jurisprudence. O'Connor's substantive standard requires
a compelling state interest that outweighs the loss of liberty. The best
interests style of representation subverts the O'Connor standard by
failing to force the state to make a sufficient case for commitment.
A. O'Connor Demands a Due Process Balancing Test
Since establishing the dangerousness standard in O'Connor,
120
the Supreme Court has failed to define what constitutes a "danger."
State legislatures have taken steps to fill this gap with civil
commitment statutes, but they still have not clearly identified the
dangers that justify commitment. 12 1 As a result, "[d]efinitions of what
is 'dangerous' tend to be as diverse as the views of individual judges,
courts, and jurisdictions."'1 22 A reexamination of the O'Connor decision
and a return to the basic principles of due process yield some insight
into the constitutional limitations inherent in the dangerousness
standard.
Although
the dangerousness
standard
serves
as a
constitutional minimum for civil commitment, without some limiting
parameters, its wide latitude would render it meaningless.
Discounting the need-for-treatment prong, 23 O'Connoridentifies three
broad categories of danger that justify civil commitment: injury to
others, active injury to self, and passive injury to self.124 One can
118. See, e.g., WINICK, supra note 12, at 61-64; Groethe, supra note 14.
119. See, e.g., Abisch, supra note 20; Cook, supra note 19.
120. Groethe, supra note 14, at 568.
121. REISNER, supra note 17, at 699.

122. Alexander Brooks, Dangerousness Defined, in LAW PSYCHIATRY & MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEMS 680 (1974).

123. See supra Part II.B.
124. Groethe, supra note 14, at 575,
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easily imagine any number of slight or speculative "dangers" concocted
by family members, attorneys, or judges seeking treatment of a
mentally ill patient that would fit into one of these categories. For
example, family members living with a mentally ill individual suffer
inconveniences and discomfort on a regular basis, including the
emotional anguish of caring for a sick relative. Sympathetic courts
could construe this reality as a "danger" unless they are restrained
somehow. If the ordinary behavior of a mentally ill person can rise to
the level of a danger, then the dangerousness requirement is
eviscerated and mental illness becomes the sole criteria for civil
commitment. Assuming that the Court did not intend to establish a
constitutional threshold without teeth, some limiting factor must
inform the O'Connor dangerousness standard.
O'Connor offered some guidance as to the nature of this
limiting factor in its dicta. It provided two examples of danger that do
not merit civil commitment, and it discounted them by applying a due
process balancing test. First, it rejected the danger that the patient
will not enjoy a minimum living standard as a justification for
commitment. 125 The Court noted "[t]hat the State has a proper
interest in providing care and assistance to the unfortunate goes
without saying. But the mere presence of mental illness does not
disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an
institution."126 Though the Court did not call attention to its use of a
due process balancing test, it essentially weighed the state interest
(providing care and assistance to the unfortunate) against the rights
of the patient (choosing his own home over an institution) and found
the justification unconstitutional. 127 Similarly, the Court dismissed as
illegitimate the danger of public discomfort stemming from contact
with the mentally ill, stating that "[o]ne might as well ask if the State,
to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically
unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity
cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical
liberty." 128 Again, the state interest (avoiding public unease) fell short
when balanced against the individual right (physical liberty). Thus, in
discounting these purported dangers, the Court implied that a due
process balancing test moderates the dangerousness standard.
This balancing test should be incorporated into a due process
analysis as a matter of course; after all, any deprivation of liberty

125.
126.
127.
128.

O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975); Groethe, supra note 14, at 576.
O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
Id. at 575-76.
Id.at 575.

2008]

CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARINGS

975

demands that the state's interest outweigh the liberty interest
involved. 129 Jurisprudence in the civil commitment context, however,
seems to have strayed from this fundamental precept by relying on the
dangerousness standard as a shortcut for all due process
considerations. In other words, statutes that include some type of
dangerousness standard are presumed to satisfy constitutional
requirements,1 30 regardless of the application of that standard.
Evidence of this laxity appears in civil commitment courtrooms,
where, as previously described, decisionmakers rubber stamp expert
opinions rather than weigh competing interests. 31 Emphasis on the
extracted phrase "danger to self or others" has oversimplified the
ruling in O'Connor, which advocated a full due process balancing test
even if it did not incorporate such a test into its holding.
B. Best Interests Representation Violates O'Connor
As noted, all states have civil commitment statutes that
somehow incorporate the O'Connor dangerousness standard, 132 but
such statutes do not necessarily guarantee mentally ill individuals
their constitutionally granted rights. Insufficient representation of
these patients still may deprive them of both procedural and
substantive due process protections. Many critics have argued that the
more relaxed best interests style of representation threatens
procedural due process.1 33 Representation by lawyers who "roll over"
in a hearing violates the right to counsel, and the presumption by
these attorneys that their clients need hospitalization violates the
right to an impartial proceeding.1 3 4 This Note extends this idea by
proposing that, in addition to incurring procedural violations, such
representation undercuts the substantive due process protections
provided by the dangerousness standard.
Theorists have recognized a link between procedural and
substantive due process in civil commitment hearings.1 35 The overt act
129. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987); see also Part II.B.
130. APPELBAUM, supra note 50, at 28 ("By the end of the 1970s, however, every state either
had changed its statute to restrict hospitalization to persons who were dangerous ... or had
interpreted its preexisting statute in this way so as to 'save' it from being found
unconstitutional.")
131. See supraPart II.D.iii.
132. APPELBAUM, supra note 50, at 28.
133. See supra Part II.D.ii; see, e.g., WINICK, supra note 12, at 145 ('The paternalistic role
played by some counsel in the civil commitment process ... thus undermines and frustrates the
goals of the procedural protections mandated by the Due Process Clause.").
134. WINICK, supra note 12, at 142-45.
135. Groethe, supra note 14, at 576 n.76.
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requirement demands proof of an overt act of past dangerous behavior
to justify civil commitment. 136 One commentator noted that this
requirement inevitably raises the substantive standard by redefining
dangerousness as a threat of harm grounded in past behavior rather
than as the mere threat of future harm. 137 The overt act requirement,
though procedural in character-asserting not what must be proven
(dangerousness) but how it must be proven (with evidence of past
acts)-influences the substantive standard. 138 The state must work
harder to make its case for commitment when the overt act
requirement is in effect. Thus, the commentator noted that "general
definitions of dangerousness are given further content by the nature of
the evidence required to support a finding that a person is
dangerous."' 39 This example is analogous, though contrary, to what
occurs when courts permit informal methods of representation; in
doing so, they reduce evidentiary standards, which in turn waters
down the dangerousness standard required by due process.
As discussed above, the state should carry the burden of
proving that the patient's level of dangerousness is sufficient to merit
a substantial curtailment of liberty. 140 The state virtually is relieved of
this burden, however, when the patient's attorney does not serve as a
zealous advocate for his client.' 4 ' In most civil commitment hearings,
the state need only present the testimony of a single clinician
recommending commitment because the best interests attorney will
not challenge the expert opinion or seek alternatives to
hospitalization. 42 Further, the best interests attorney who feels that
his client needs hospitalization will tend to presume that the charges
against the client are true, thereby failing to investigate or question
the client thoroughly. 143 Thus, the court hears the testimony of one
unopposed doctor, scant evidence with which to justify indefinite
confinement. This style of representation undermines the
dangerousness standard by significantly relaxing the burden on the
state, 44 thus bypassing the due process balancing test that would

136 . Id.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

at 562.

Id. at 576.
Groethe, supra note 14, at 576.
Id.
See supraPart III.A.
See generally Costello, supra note 114.
Id. at 30-31.
Id.
See id.
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force the state to prove that the danger posed is sufficient to justify
commitment. 145
Additionally, this approach transforms certain police power
commitments into parens patriae commitments. Generally, the best
interests attorney plays a passive role because he has determined that
the patient needs hospitalization, and he knows that his failure to
challenge the state's evidence will result in commitment. 146 He
assumes that the client, in refusing treatment, does not recognize his
own best interests, and he unilaterally decides that the patient needs
the protection of the state. 14 7 Therefore, in cases where the client is
committed under the "danger to others" prong, the best interests
attorney privately applies a parenspatriaejustification while publicly
invoking the police power. Though the best interests attorney
presumably acts (or fails to act) with noble intentions, this
paternalism subverts the dangerousness standard by presupposing
that the patient needs hospitalization without a formal inquiry into
his ability to care for himself or his competency to make his own
treatment decisions. 148 Further, this method unfairly brands the
patient as dangerous when, in reality, he may be a nondangerous
individual who needs the treatment offered by the state. Placing the
client in an inappropriate category of dangerousness potentially could
affect his future treatment and his psychological health, and it also
could negatively impact his relationships with the court system, the
attorney, and even his family members. 149 Thus, the due process
violations for this particular type of best interests representation
carry particularly harmful repercussions for the patient.
The dangerousness standard, when properly defined as
incorporating a case-by-case due process examination, represents a
considerable limitation on civil commitments. When attorneys engage
in best interests representation, they disregard the severity of this
limitation by reducing the state's burden of proof for the
dangerousness element, thus violating due process. The next Part will
propose a solution that attempts to introduce adequate due process
into the civil commitment hearing.

145. See supra Part III.A.
146. See generally Costello, supra note 114.
147. Id. at 30-31.
148. See WINICK, supra note 12, at 145 ("[Ihe system assumes that the individual is a
legitimate subject of paternalism whose commitment is necessary to prevent danger to himself or
others, when in fact he may not satisfy this condition ... !).
149. See, e.g., id. (examining how the legal process itself can have anti-therapeutic effects on
civil commitment patients).
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IV. SOLUTION: A MORE HONEST CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARING

This Note does not seek to vilify attorneys who presume that
their clients need hospitalization and represent them accordingly.
Best interests representation has flourished because well-meaning
attorneys do not realize the harm they are causing for their clients
and the system. Courts and legislatures have provided few guidelines
regarding the required level of dangerousness 150 or the optimal style of
representation. 151 This Part recommends a move towards more clearly
defined civil commitment standards, which will eliminate the "basic
dishonesty in the civil commitment process"'1 2 perpetuated in large
part by best interests representation. In order to fashion a more
honest civil commitment process, courts must reevaluate both the
dangerousness standard and the role of respondents' counsel.
A. Reevaluating the Substantive Standard
As it stands, the dangerousness standard for civil commitment
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 153 and because attorneys can
manipulate the standard through best interests representation, it can
even vary from case to case. 154 Though the O'Connor Court stipulated
the "danger to self or others" requirement, it did not advise courts or
attorneys on how to apply it.155 The result is the hodgepodge of
standards that now exists. The Supreme Court should resolve the
confusion by clarifying the due process parameters of the
dangerousness standard. The O'Connor Court used a balancing test to
find a sufficient danger, but it did not highlight the test as necessary
for due process compliance. The Court should explicitly require that,
prior to any civil commitment, courts perform a due process balancing
test that weighs the fundamental liberty interest at stake against the
interests of the state.1 5 6 While this compelling government interest
test should be implicit in all state infringement cases, insisting that
courts articulate the competing interests and their respective weights
will ensure that they conduct the test properly and thoughtfully.

150. Brooks, supra note 122, at 680.
151. Cook, supra note 19, at 182.
152. WINICK, supranote 12, at 143.
153. Brooks, supra note 122, at 680.
154. See supra Part III.B.
155. Groethe, supranote 14, at 568-69.
156. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (D.C. Wis. 1972) (describing the
balancing test, extrapolated from the Supreme Court's decision in Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504 (1972)).
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The balancing test should incorporate each of the three major
elements of dangerousness: the type of danger, the immediacy of the
danger, and the likelihood of the danger. 15 7 These inclusions allow the
court not only to consider the seriousness and likelihood of the
possible harm, but also to account for the risk of error associated with
predicting future behavior. For example, if the client's doctor testified
to a slight chance that his patient would inflict serious bodily harm in
the near future, the uncertainty of that prediction would reduce the
state's interest in commitment. On the other hand, if doctors were
certain that the patient would inflict serious property damage in the
near future, the state's lesser interest in protecting property might be
sufficient to justify commitment due to the certainty that the harm
will occur. Thus, a balancing test that incorporates the key
components of dangerousness provides the most robust analysis for
determining when a certain danger substantiates commitment.
A redefined dangerousness standard that incorporates a
comprehensive balancing test, like the one described above, would
supply consistency and boundaries to the current dangerousness
standard. Though the proposed balancing test appears in O'Connor's
dicta, the Court should revisit the issue to bring attention to the
substantive due process minimums involved in civil commitment. A
Supreme Court-mandated balancing test would compel the
participants in the civil commitment process to acknowledge the
fundamental nature of the liberties at stake and the correspondingly
high level of danger necessary to revoke them.
B. Reevaluating the Role of Respondents' Counsel
With the debate between adversarial and best interests
representation recast as a substantive due process debate, it becomes
apparent that best interests representation violates the O'Connor
standard.158 As discussed above, the best interests attorney subverts
the dangerousness standard by engaging in veiled paternalism,
allowing the state to commit a person without proving that the
potential danger outweighs the individual rights of the patient.
Conversely, the adversarial model respects the dangerousness
standard. By actively disputing that the patient needs hospitalization,
the adversarial attorney compels the state to make a strong case in
favor of commitment, forcing it to prove that the danger outweighs the
consequences of the commitment.
157. See supra Part II.B.
158. See supra Part III.B.
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In order to preserve the dangerousness standard, the legal
system should demand that attorneys deliver adversarial
representation to their mentally ill clients. State legislatures and
supreme courts could implement this requirement by enacting state
statutes or amending court rules. Some states already have statutes
that encourage zealous advocacy, but only Tennessee has adopted a
state law specifically stating that the attorney should not act as a
guardian ad litem. 159 Further, courts could sanction noncompliant
attorneys with public censure or even monetary fines and suspension.
These tactics would not prevent every attorney from adopting a best
interests approach, but they would lend the symbolic support of the
court to the adversarial model, which likely would have a noticeable
impact on the behavior of the attorneys in that court.
Additionally, requiring a due process balancing test prior to
civil commitment determinations would redefine the role of counsel in
such hearings. Indeed, the due process balancing test previously
described cannot serve its end without the participation of adversarial
attorneys. The court cannot balance competing interests accurately
unless presented with those interests during the hearing. Thus, an
attorney who does not provide adequate representation would
undermine the redefined dangerousness standard even more critically
than he undermines the current one. Unlike the current standard,
however, the balancing test removes some of the incentives for
patients' attorneys to undertake best interests representation by
reducing the perceived responsibility that they must act as guardians
for their clients. 160 First, the revised standard shifts the burden of
proof back to the state to articulate a compelling interest sufficient to
outweigh a deprivation of liberty. If the client really needs treatment,
the state likely would establish that need by following the strictures of
the balancing test; patients' lawyers thus can let the state justify
commitment without helping it to do so. Second, the test demands
specific information and improves the transparency of the civil
commitment process, which discourages any omissions. For example,
if a best interest attorney fails to ask a doctor about the likelihood of a
predicted harm, the court would request the information as necessary
to the due process analysis that it must perform. Thus, the test would
induce patients' attorneys to do their homework and present all
relevant facts at the hearing.
As stated, patients' counsel should not bear all of the blame for
the current laxity in applying the dangerousness standard; judges,
159. See Stone, supra note 20, at 624; Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-419 (2008).
160. See supra Part W.A.
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clinicians, and family members contribute to the dismal state of civil
commitment jurisprudence. 161 Respondents' attorneys can alter the
realities in the courtroom, however, by taking an active role in the
proceedings. Once attorneys refuse to defer to expert witnesses, judges
will accept that these attorneys have a right to voice their opposition
and cross-examine witnesses, and doctors will come to expect the other
side to challenge their opinions. Families seeking commitment will
understand that confining a relative to a psychiatric hospital should
not be taken lightly. Ultimately, all of these changes would benefit the
patient, respecting his autonomy and right to a fair hearing. An
adversarial stance by attorneys ultimately would result in a more
honest civil commitment process.
CONCLUSION

The due process guarantee that no person shall "be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" 16 2 faces unique
challenges in the civil commitment context. A major area of debate has
focused on the style of representation that optimizes procedural due
process for the mentally ill patient, but this debate has overlooked
how representation styles influence substantive standards. This Note
argues that the best interests model of representation violates the
dangerousness standard, which requires a due process balancing test
in every civil commitment hearing, while an adversarial model
upholds the heightened standards mandated by the Supreme Court
and the Due Process Clause. Thus, attorneys must use an adversarial
approach in civil commitment hearings to meet constitutional
minimums. The extra effort expended by patients' attorneys would
benefit not only the patients involved, but also the civil commitment
system, improving its integrity by keeping it consistent with the spirit
of a Due Process Clause that refuses to revoke fundamental rights
without a compelling reason.
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